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from the National Center for Health Statistics of the 
Centers for Disease Control to examine the annual 
volume of births and deaths among whites from 1999 
to 2014 for each state.4 We focus on whites because 
they represent the largest share of the U.S. population 
and because their demographic profile increases the 
likelihood of natural decrease. We find a significant 
rise in the number of states experiencing white natural 
decrease in the last few years. The comparison of these 
states to others where white births exceed deaths helps 
us to understand what combination of demographic 
changes produce natural decrease. Though white natu-
ral decrease is clearly on the rise, only two states have 
more deaths than births in their total populations. This 
low incidence of overall natural decrease in U.S. states 
reflects the growing importance of Latino natural 
increase to overall U.S. demographic trends.
In 2014, deaths among non-Hispanic whites exceeded births in more states than at any time in U.S. history. Seventeen states, home to 121 million residents or 
roughly 38 percent of the U.S. population, had more deaths 
than births among non-Hispanic whites (hereafter referred 
to as whites) in 2014, compared to just four in 2004. When 
births fail to keep pace with deaths, a region is said to have 
a “natural decrease” in population, which can only be offset 
by migration gains. In twelve of the seventeen states with 
white natural decreases, the white population diminished 
overall between 2013 and 2014. 
This research is the first to examine the growing inci-
dence of white natural decrease among U.S. states and 
to consider its policy implications. Our analysis of the 
demographic factors that cause white natural decrease 
suggests that the pace is likely to pick up in the future. 
Over the last several decades, demographers have 
noted the growing incidence of natural decrease in the 
United States.1 More widespread natural decrease results 
from declining fertility due to the Great Recession, and 
the aging of the large baby boom cohorts born between 
1946 and 1964. This senior population is projected to 
expand from nearly 15 percent of the total population in 
2015 to nearly 24 percent in 2060.2 Much of this aging 
baby boom population is white, and so white mortal-
ity is growing. Together, growing white mortality and 
the diminishing number of white births increase the 
likelihood of more white natural decrease. In contrast, 
births exceed deaths by a considerable margin among 
the younger Latino population, and the combination of 
these very different demographic trends is increasing the 
diversity of the U.S. population.3
Though demographers have documented the grow-
ing incidence of natural decrease among the overall 
population in U.S. counties, little attention has been 
given to its occurrence among racial sub-groups at any 
level of geography. To address this gap, we use data 
FIGURE 1. BIRTHS AND DEATHS AMONG WHITES, 1999–2014
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control
Fewer White Births and 
More White Deaths
Between 1999 and 2014, the num-
ber of white births fell by 8.4 per-
cent to 2,150,000 and the number 
of white deaths rose by 5.8 percent 
to 2,066,000. Both these demo-
graphic changes contributed to 
waning levels of natural increase 
(Figure 1). The pace of decline in 
white births intensified from 2007 
to 2013, due in part to the Great 
Recession’s significant impact on 
U.S. fertility.5 The recession, the 
greatest shock to the American 
economic system in nearly two 
generations, influenced both 
fertility and life-cycle decisions for 
many families. 
With significantly fewer white 
births and a rising number of 
deaths, natural increase (births 
minus deaths) plummeted from 
393,000 in 1999 to just 82,000 
in 2014, a decline of 79 per-
cent. Though the rising volume 
of deaths (an increase of nearly 
114,000) contributed significantly 
to this dwindling natural increase, 
it was the diminishing number of 
births (a decline of 197,000) that 
accounted for most of the reduc-
tion in natural increase.
Demographers often use the 
birth-to-death ratio (BDR) to 
track the changing relationship 
between fertility and mortality in 
a population. For whites, the BDR 
fell from 1.20 in 1999 to just 1.04 
in 2014 (Figure 2). Thus, the num-
ber of white births for each white 
death declined from 1.20 to 1.04.
Increasing Incidence of 
States With More White 
Deaths Than Births
While national data reflect a signifi-
cant reduction in natural increase 
among whites between 1999 and 
2014, the onset of natural decrease 
has only occurred recently in many 
states. In 1999, four states had white 
natural decrease; by 2014 seventeen 
states did. The steepest rise 
occurred after 2006, when the Great 
Recession began to exert a substan-
tial impact on fertility (Figure 3). 
Several states have experi-
enced protracted white natural 
decrease. It has been occurring 
for more than a decade in Florida, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West 
Virginia, California, and New 
Mexico. Past research on natural 
FIGURE 2. BIRTH-TO-DEATH RATIO AMONG WHITES, 1999–2014
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control
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decrease in U.S. counties noted that 
it was occurring mostly in rural 
areas.6 In contrast, state-level white 
natural decrease is occurring in 
populous states such as California, 
Florida, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
Arizona, and Massachusetts, 
which have diverse economies and 
numerous metropolitan areas.
A finding from previous research 
on natural decrease, which is 
consistent with our findings, is that 
once an area begins to experience 
natural decrease, the trend is likely 
to continue.7 Only California, New 
Mexico, and West Virginia have 
experienced natural increase after 
the initial onset of decrease (Figure 
3), and in each case it was only for 
a year. This pattern suggests a high 
likelihood of future natural decrease 
among these seventeen states. More 
states are likely to begin to have 
white natural decrease in the near 
future. Vermont and South Carolina 
have each sustained a significant 
drop in white natural increase over 
the past five years—from 598 in 
2010 to just 182 in 2014 in Vermont, 
and from 3,120 in 2010 to 339 in 
2014 in South Carolina. Tennessee 
and Oregon have also recently 
experienced precipitous declines in 
white natural increase.
Geographic Distribution 
of States by Level of 
Natural Change
There is considerable spatial varia-
tion in the level of white natural 
increase or decrease among the 
states. Figure 4 divides the fifty states 
and the District of Columbia into 
three categories based on their white 
birth-to-death ratios in 2014: the sev-
enteen natural-decrease states (BDR 
less than 1, reflecting fewer births 
than deaths); the fifteen states where 
births modestly exceeded deaths 
(BDR between 1.00 and 1.14); and 
the nineteen high natural-increase 
states (BDR of 1.15 or higher). 
White natural decrease states 
are widely dispersed, with clusters 
in the South, West, and Northeast 
regions. States with minimal white 
natural increase are also widely 
distributed, though they are often 
in close proximity to the natural-
decrease states. States with high 
natural increase are concentrated 
in the Mountain West and the West 
North Central regions but also 
include Texas, Louisiana, Indiana, 
and Virginia.
More Older Adults, 
Fewer Mothers, and Low 
Fertility Drive White 
Natural Decrease
Powerful demographic forces have 
combined to raise the incidence 
of white natural decrease. Here we 
consider four demographic fac-
tors that have been identified as 
important in accounting for natural 
decrease in both the United States 
and Europe.8
First, the percentage of the white 
population that is 65 and older in 
2014 reflects the age structure of the 
state.9 Generally, an older popula-
tion increases the likelihood of 
natural decrease due to an increase 
in deaths. Second, the percentage of 
white women 15 and older who are 
in their childbearing years (15–44) 
in 2014 signifies the relative share 
of women who are capable of giv-
ing birth.10 A larger proportion of 
women in their childbearing years 
is likely to increase the number of 
births. Third, the white total fertility 
rate in 2014 represents the average 
number of births per woman in the 
state.11 High fertility rates diminish 
the likelihood of natural decrease 
FIGURE 3. STATES WITH MORE DEATHS THAN BIRTHS AMONG WHITE 
POPULATION, 1999–2014
Source: Authors’ compilation of data from National Center for Health Statistic, Centers for Disease Control
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by increasing the number of births. 
Fourth, the percentage of white 
females less than 15 years of age 
represents the relative availability of 
cohorts who will enter their child-
bearing years in the near future.12 
This reflects the potential of the next 
generation of women to produce 
future children. For each of these 
demographic variables, we divided 
states into those that rank in the 
low, moderate, and high category 
based on the state’s value compared 
to other states. 
The narrowing gap between 
white births and deaths reflects the 
influence of the first three of these 
demographic forces. As expected, 
the likelihood of white natural 
decrease is greatest in states with a 
large concentration of older whites 
(Figure 5A). The white population 
is aging rapidly, as reflected in a rise 
in median age for whites from 39 in 
2000 to 43 in 2014. During the same 
period, the percentage of persons 65 
and older increased from 15 percent 
of the white population in 2000 to 
18 percent in 2014. Because older 
populations face higher mortality 
risks, population aging increases 
the number of white deaths. Nearly 
71 percent of the natural-decrease 
states had a high percentage of their 
populations in the 65-and-over 
category, compared to none of the 
states with a relatively high white 
birth-to-death ratio.
Another important factor is 
the proportional share of white 
women of childbearing age. 
Previous research suggests that 
natural decrease is more likely 
when there are fewer women 
of childbearing age. Overall, 
the number of white women of 
childbearing age (15–44) declined 
by 4.7 million between 2000 
and 2014, or nearly 12 percent. 
Approximately 71 percent of 
the natural-decrease states had 
relatively few white women of 
childbearing age (Figure 5B). In 
contrast, nearly 74 percent of the 
high natural-increase states had 
a high percentage of women of 
childbearing age.
White natural decrease is also 
more common in states that have 
low white fertility rates. Nearly 65 
percent of the natural-decrease 
states are in the lowest fertil-
ity category, compared to just 16 
percent of the states with high 
levels of natural increase (Figure 
5C). However, the differences here 
are less pronounced than those 
for the proportion over 65 and for 
the proportion of women in their 
childbearing years. Some natural-
decrease states have moderate or 
relatively high fertility levels.
The demographic factors exam-
ined so far help to explain why 
some states currently have white 
natural decrease and others do not. 
The percent of the female popula-
tion less than 15 years old gives 
us a glimpse of the future. States 
with smaller proportions of white 
females under 15 have less poten-
tial for future white births than 
states with larger portions of young 
females. Most natural-decrease 
states have relatively small cohorts 
of young white females, thus the 
risk of continued natural decrease 
is high for them (Figure 5D). In 
contrast, states that currently have 
a large excess of white births over 
deaths also have a larger percent-
age of young white females able to 
produce the next generation.
In sum, the likelihood of white 
natural decrease is greatest in states 
FIGURE 4. STATES BY INCIDENCE OF WHITE NATURAL INCREASE OR 
DECREASE, 2014
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control
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that have a larger proportion of 
older adults, a smaller proportion of 
women of childbearing age, and a 
lower fertility rate. 
Few States Have Natural 
Decline in Total Population
Though one-third of U.S. states 
had more white deaths than white 
births in 2014, only two states—
West Virginia and Maine—had 
more deaths than births in their 
overall populations. West Virginia 
has had natural decrease in its total 
population in twelve of the last six-
teen years; Maine has experienced 
it in each of the last four years 
(2011–2014). The other fifteen 
states with white natural decrease 
are still experiencing overall natu-
ral increase because other racial/
ethnic populations, especially 
Latinos, produced a great enough 
surplus of births over deaths to 
offset the white natural decrease. 
The Latino population is consider-
ably younger (median age of 28.4 in 
2014) and has higher fertility rates 
than the white population, and so 
Latino births exceeded deaths by a 
substantial margin in all fifty states 
and the District of Columbia in 2014. 
In twelve of the seventeen states 
with more white deaths than births 
in 2014, Latino natural increase 
alone was sufficient to offset the nat-
ural decline of whites. In California, 
for example, the Latino natural 
FIGURE 5. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF STATES BY LEVEL OF NATURAL CHANGE ASSOCIATED WITH 
FOUR EXPLANATORY FACTORS AMONG WHITES, 2014 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control; U.S. Census Bureau population estimates; and American Community Survey public-use file.
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increase of 193,311 was far greater 
than the 13,168 natural decrease of 
whites. However, in the other five 
states, the natural decline of whites 
was greater than the Latino natural 
increase. In Florida, for example, the 
Latino natural increase was 39,768, 
compared to a natural decrease of 
40,565 among whites. Gains among 
other minorities in Florida supple-
mented the Latino gain to produce 
an overall natural increase. In Maine 
and West Virginia, the two states 
with overall natural decline, there 
were few Latinos or members of 
other minority groups to offset the 
white natural decrease. 
Conclusion
Our research, the first to examine 
white natural decrease at the state 
level, finds that seventeen states are 
experiencing it currently and that its 
occurrence has increased substan-
tially over the past decade. We also 
find that several of the states expe-
riencing white natural decline are 
among the nation’s most populous 
and urbanized. Here our findings dif-
fer from prior county-level research 
that has suggested that overall natural 
decrease tends to be concentrated in 
rural areas of the Great Plains.13 
A policy issue with significant 
implications for white natural 
decrease is the increasing rate of 
mortality among working-class 
whites from drug and alcohol abuse 
and suicide.14 Drug-induced deaths 
(including intentional suicide 
deaths and accidental drug overdose 
deaths) outnumbered motor vehicle 
accident deaths among whites in 
forty-one states in 2014 compared 
to ten states in 2004.15 All but two 
of the seventeen states where white 
deaths exceeded births had more 
drug-induced deaths than motor 
vehicle accident deaths in 2014. 
Such drug-related overdose deaths 
are likely to speed the transition 
from natural increase to natural 
decrease in some states. 
The growing natural decline 
among whites in U.S. states contrib-
utes to the larger racial/ethnic shifts 
occurring in the U.S. population. As 
white natural increase has dimin-
ished, the share of the U.S. popula-
tion that is white has declined from 
79.6 percent in 1980 to 61.9 percent 
in 2014. Census Bureau projections 
suggest that the white population 
will begin to decline in absolute 
numbers between 2030 and 2040, 
and that by 2050 whites will con-
stitute less than half (47 percent) of 
the U.S. population.16 
In contrast, the youthful Latino 
population has increased signifi-
cantly over the last three decades. 
It is responsible for the majority of 
all U.S. population increase and is 
expected to contribute even more in 
the future.17 The share of the nation’s 
population that is Latino rose from 
6.4 percent in 1980 to 17.3 percent 
in 2014, and it is projected to reach 
29 percent by 2060.18
As we have seen, Latino natu-
ral increase has been a signifi-
cant contributor to overall U.S. 
natural increase over the past 
several decades. However, it dimin-
ished with the onset of the Great 
Recession, declining from 927,000 
in 2007 to 745,000 in 2014. Factors 
contributing to this decline include a 
significant drop in immigration from 
Mexico19 and a substantial reduc-
tion in births.20 Latina births fell by 
14 percent between 2007 and 2014, 
twice as great as the decline in white 
births (7 percent).21 Further reduc-
tions in fertility as well as reduced 
immigration for Latinos could make 
it less likely that Latino natural 
increase will be sufficient to offset 
white natural decline in some states.
The demographic trends underly-
ing the current natural decline of 
whites and the increasing shift to a 
more racially/ethnically diverse U.S. 
population have major policy impli-
cations. First, the largely white older 
population will grow rapidly as 
baby boom cohorts continue to age. 
As they do, demands on the health 
care and retirement system will 
dramatically increase. Second, the 
youthful population—increasingly 
a population of color—will require 
major investments in education and 
training if the United States is to 
maintain a productive workforce in 
an increasingly competitive tech-
nological and global labor market. 
With an aging white population 
and a youthful population increas-
ingly of color, each with competing 
demands on government budgets, 
there is considerable potential 
for conflicts concerning fund-
ing priorities. However, these new 
generations of color also provide a 
potential demographic lifeline to 
America’s aging white population 
by reinvigorating local commerce 
and labor markets and by fostering 
economic development that will 
contribute to meeting the growing 
demands on the nation’s health care 
and retirement programs.22
Natural decrease is the ultimate 
demographic consequence of 
population aging, low fertility, and 
a diminishing proportion of the 
childbearing-age population. The 
rapid rise in the number of U.S. 
states experiencing white natural 
decrease reflects the demographic 
changes underway. Our analysis 
suggests that more states are likely 
to experience white natural decrease 
in the near future. However, there is 
a low probability of natural decrease 
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in the overall population in most 
states in the foreseeable future due 
to the substantial natural increase 
among Latinos, African Americans, 
Asians, and native peoples. 
Many developed nations already 
face far more widespread natural 
decrease than the United States.23 In 
Europe, overall deaths exceed births 
in seventeen countries.24 Compared 
to the United States, European 
fertility rates are lower, the popula-
tion is considerably older, and there 
are fewer women of childbearing 
age. Thus, the immediate challenges 
European nations face in dealing 
with widespread natural decrease 
may provide important lessons to 
U.S. policy makers as they prepare 
to address this issue in the future. 
Data
Birth and death data in this brief are 
from the National Center for Health 
Statistics (NCHS) of the Centers 
for Disease Control’s WONDER 
database for each year between 1999 
and 2014.25 Data on the percentage 
of elderly, the percentage of women 
of childbearing age, and the per-
centage of females who are less than 
15 years of age are from the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s Annual Estimates 
of the Resident Population by Sex, 
Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin 
for the United States and States 
for July 1, 2014.26 The data used to 
compute the total fertility rate are 
derived from the 2014 American 
Community Survey public-use file.
The classification of births and 
deaths by race in the NCHS data 
used here differs from the proce-
dures used by the Census Bureau. 
Thus, there are differences in the 
number of births and deaths classi-
fied in a specific category by race/
Hispanic origin between the two 
agencies. NCHS data do not allow 
for classification of multiple-race 
births or deaths—so all births are 
classified into one race category, that 
of the infant’s mother; the race and 
Hispanic origin of the infant’s father 
are not considered. In contrast, 
Census Bureau estimates allow inclu-
sion of births and deaths of two or 
more races. NCHS data consistently 
show more non-Hispanic white 
births and fewer Hispanic births 
than Census data at the national 
level. Thus, our calculations likely 
underestimate white natural decrease 
compared to similar estimates using 
Census Bureau data. Only NCHS 
data are available for race/Hispanic 
origin of births and deaths for states. 
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